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An heroie past, graat nan, true (lory— auch is the 
sooial oapital upon which reata a national idea. To have 
ooaaon (lories in the paat, a ooaaon will in the preaent; 
to have done great things together, to wish to do aore--suoh 
are the essential conditions in order to be a people.
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Prafaoa— Sob* Personal Not**
I want to Churoh tonight.
As wa eliabad tha ataira to tha Bvangalittaos Oraak 
Orthodox Choroh, I oould haar tha ausioal ohantinf of tha 
Biahop Iakovoa Mho waa oonduoting tha oa^aron.. I couldn't 
halp thinking how aiailar tha rapatitiva ohat.ta of tha 
Biahop wara to tha Turkish bally-danoing auaio I had hoard 
onoa in a raetaurant. To agitato a raligioua hyan to male 
danoad to by half nakad woman ia ironie (and disraspaotful) 
anough but avan aora ironio ia that tonight wa wont to 
Churoh to oolabrata tha Oraak's indapandonoa froa thair 
Turkiah anaay in 1821— and tha vary auaio playad in 
oalabration froa fraadoa froa tha Turks aoundad, to aa, lika 
Turkish auaio.
Ironio as it aay ba, it is not aitogathsr 
surprising to find yat anothar aiailarity batwaan tha Turks 
and tha Oraaks. In doing ay rasaaroh for this thasis, I
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*f*m *tijm  th* "naroiasis* of m m
(fblkan, sift, p. xl). Ho explained tfcii atateaent •* tho 
phanoaenon where two states whioh woo olose in prexitity, m  
wall •• olooo othnloally, m y  hovo oonstant foudo over 
"ridiculouo" thing*. Ho qualified hia observation by giving 
the *x*apl*s of the Spaniard! and Portugueae, the North 
0*rasas and the South Oeraans, the English and the Sootoh, 
the Arabs and the Jews, the lnglish and the Irish and so on. 
In hia foreword to Varaik Volkans, Cyprus— -tar and 
Adaptation. John Maek, Professor of Psychiatry at the 
Harvard Hedioal Sohool, explains Freud's stateaent by saying 
that a oountry, so siailai in oharaoter to another, is seen 
as an eneny when it is porooived to be a threat to the 
"worth or survival" of that group (p. xi). This, I think, 
is when the nationalisa of a oountry turns into offensive 
ohauvinisa, or naroissisa; and, this, I think, is partly 
what happened to the Oreeks and Turks, especially those on 
the island of Cyprus.
aesaerising chants whioh were honoring the Annunoiation-- 
also celebrated tonight at ohurch— the priest interjected 
poetio reainders of the struggles of the Oreeks who, in 
1821, fought for the right to praotioe their religion, aaong
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tillit things. Us reninded ths crowded ohttroh of ths 
"tyranny and oppression" of tho forks and of ths b*#wetfr of
ths Greiks who, lad by ths cross, wars able to gain book 
aoso of thsir freedons and rights as Greeks. This wary 
holiday which falls on tha sane day as the Annunoiation and 
which is so inportant to tha Greeks narks, for ths Turks, 
ths beginning of tha decline of tha Ottoaan Bnpire. With 
such opposing nationalisas, how oould they aven pretend to 
have good relations; how oould tha fornar Prina Minister 
Bulent Soavit speak of tha fornar Greek Prina Minister, 
George Karananlis, as “ny brother, to whon wa era adjoined 
by the blue Aegean" (Stavrou, 1986, p.12) ? Perhaps, as Dr 
Thaofanis Stavrou of Indiana University, said in a spaaoh, 
it is during ths tines of "honeynoon when they nay sand 
poans to one another" (p. 10). These tines of "honeynoon" 
are rare, though, and aven during these tines, tha efforts 
to inprova relations seen superficial. How oan they not 
seen insincere when a faw nonthe after suoh exchange of 
poetio words, the Greek flags will once again be waving in 
the faces of the Turks, reninding then of their bitter and 
great defeat, and even worse, they will be waving in the 
hearts of the Greeks reninding then of the “tyrannioal and 
oppressive" Turks who once controlled the lives of their 
ancestors. The flans of pride, of ohauvinisn, of
naroissisa, is re-lit never allowing for • ehittfef to foigive 
or perhaps just forget their aiioient wounds.
The situation on Cyprus is intensified by the 
geographical closeness of the two oossunities. Both the 
Turks and the Greeks oarry the flags and sing the anthess of 
Turkey and Greece. They celebrate the saae national holidays 
as their "Bother" oountries It is no wonder that in 1974, 
after being shown sons saps of Cyprus that the U.S. Senate 
was surprised that Cyprus had not already been divided 
(Stavrou, 19B8, p.15). How could neighboring villages of 
Turks and Greeks live side by side and not be antagonised, 
for exaaple, by the holidays oelebrating the other’s defeat?
Yet a division did not occur earlier than 1974.
In fact, the Cypriots were actually living as a basioally 
united island despite the diverse races, ethnic groups, and 
religions up until the late nineteenth century, ghat 
events, then, led to the invasion from the Turks in 1974 and 
the resulting declaration of the northern Republic of Cyprus 
in 1983?
This is what 1 will try to answer in ay thesis. 1 
will look at the historical influences of the various 
empires which say have contributed to the division as well 
as the sore current influence of Greece and Turkey whioh 
have also had an impact on tne partition and have played a
••dor role in preventing, perhaps involuntarily, a solution 
froa being found.
Through the various Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
that I have wet during ay research, and through the
literature on the issue, I have been overwhelmed by the 
amount of passion and intensity that the citizens have about 
the subject. I will try to be objective in ay analysis but
it is ay hope that the intense and passionate feelings of
the Cypriots to whoa I have spoken will also be conveyed in 
the pages that follow.
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Brief Synopsis
The island in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus, 
has been dominated by one empire after another, ending with 
the British Empire who, in 1960, relinquished it in the name 
of self-determination. Three years after independence, 
communal tensions broke out between the Greek Cypriots (80% 
of the population) and the Turkish Cypriots (18% of the 
population) (Kennedy, 1978, p. 1). These tensions were the 
result of antagonistic loyalties towards Greece and Turkey 
and, more so, the result of international parties, including 
and especially Greece and Turkey, who benefited from the 
ongoing conflict (Joseph, 1985, p . 3). The Greeks felt that 
their position as majority of the island was being watered 
down by a coalition formed between either the British and 
the Cypriot Turks or, after the independence, between the 
mainland Turks and the Cypriot Turks. The Turks, on the 
other hand, felt that if the Greeks were to be left 
unwatched, they would bypass the human rights of the Turks 
and most probably try to unite with Greece, as was their 
goal with enosis. which would leave the Turkish Cypriots in 
the hands of their historic enemy. In reaction, the Turks
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threatened to partition the island, following the idea of 
taksim, which they did after the threats of enosis started 
to be realized. In 1974, Turkish troops, armed with 
American weapons, invaded the island, killing 5000 Cypriots, 
and making 200,000 people refugees. In 1983, the Turks 
unilaterally declared their invaded region as the Northern 
Republic of Cyprus, an act which is recognized by no one 
(Kennedy, 1976, p. 1). Today, the Cypriot Turks vote in a 
large part against the partition and the Greeks still mourn 
the loss of their families and homes. The division serves 
as a constant tension between the two communities on the 
island, between the mainland Greeks and Turks, and is of 
consistent international concern.
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Cyprus as a Case Study: 
An Introduction
The politics of the post-Horld War II era were 
dominated by the problems resulting from the expansion of 
the state system. Among these problems was that of ethnic 
integration which involved incorporating more than one 
nationality within a boundary. In many instances political 
division and partition were looked at as solutions for the 
problem of governing these multiethnic societies. Division, 
however, has often proved to be an unsatisfactory result 
because it frequently creates international disputes 
(Coufoudakis, 1976, p . 27). Cyprus is a perfect example of 
such a multiethnic state that, after failing attempts to 
create a united binational state, has been the victim of a 
division.
Before examining the case of Cyprus, some 
definitions and examples of political division and partition 
will be helpful. First, to define the terms, Ray Johnston, 
of the Internet on Divided Nations has provided the 
following meanings. Political partition can be seen in
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countries like Korea, Germany, and Vietnam and is explained 
as:
"'the separate political allegiances of people 
within a common geographical unit to different 
politioal regimes; an end point in a oontinuum 
ranging from politioal integration at one end to 
partition at the other; a disruption of 
institutional structures and a sundering of 
ongoing political relationships, whioh prior to 
partition are organised under a common 
authority...political partition is a deliberate 
politioal action taken by internal or external 
elites and followers; a behavioral process by 
which group, based on several different 
characteristics, begins making demands for 
control of either narrow or broad aspect* of 
group fate...'” (Coufoudakis, 1976, p. 29).
With the allegianoes that were formed with Greece 
and Turkey, the failing attempts at integration, the 
deliberate aotion of the Turks to divide the island, and the 
processes of enoais and taksim, the above definition 
describee the situation on Cyprus perfectly. The same holds 
true for the definition given for political division whioh 
can be seen in countries like Ireland, India and Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and Palestine and is defined as:
"‘the division of formerly unified political units 
into new entities based on ethnic, cultural, and 
national identity; it occurs through the 
imposition of territorial boundaries of people and 
resources into separate politically sovereign 
entities. Such imposition may occur by external 
powers or result from oonfliot and bargaining 
among powers party to the division'” (Coufoudakis, 
1976, p. 29).
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Cyprus was "formerly unified" undar the Ottoman 
and British Empires before being divided into "nee entities" 
of Oreek and Turkish communities and it is ourrently divided 
by the military influenoe of Turkey. As sueh Cyprus has 
been both politically divided and partitioned.
These definitions are particularly applicable to 
the oase of Cyprus as the parallels above show but they are 
especially important because they recognise the significance 
of external factors in creating a partition and eventual 
division which will be the focus of this paper.
These examples of political division and partition 
are related to the decolonisation of post-NorId far II 
politics. Qreat Britain, by 1945, was the largest empire in 
the world. This meant that more then one fourth of the 
worlds population, about six hundred million people were 
governed from London. By 1946, only two hundred million 
people were still being governed under England; the rest 
had reoeived their independence. In this way, many new 
states were created: as mentioned, India, Pakistan, Israel, 
as well as Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Burma, Egypt, Iraq, and 
Jordan to name only a few (Bertsch, 1986, p. 362). Like 
these oountries, Cyprus too gained her independence from 
Orest Britain and as such oan be studied as a olassio
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example of "nothing else but the ugly child of British 
imperialism" (Stavrou, 1996, p. 10). Cyprus, like many of 
these countries, was asking for self determination. Unlike 
many of these countries, however, the Cypriots also wanted 
to be united with Greece (enosis) once they reached 
independence from England. This was a complicating factor 
sinoe, although the Greek inhabitants on the island formed 
the majority and the majority wished for self determination, 
the eighteen per cent Turkish Cypriots on the island were 
furiously opposed to being ruled by a country that was their 
historic enemy. Despite this faotor, however, Cyprus was 
still affeoted, as many of Great Britain's oolonies were, by 
the polioy of divide and rule and as such can be examined as 
a case study of a republic trying to survive the effects of 
such an offensive policy.
Cyprus' situation does not appear particularly 
unique in face of the many Crown Colonies whioh suffered the 
effects of the divide and rule policy; nor does it seem 
unique as a post Norld Mar II victim of multiethnic 
integration problems. If not unique, then, what 
characterizes Cyprus as an exceptionally significant case to 
study? Firstly, Cyprus involves the very current issue of 
the relations between Greece and Turkey, two MATO allies, 
and two historic enemies. Since the Ottoman takeover of
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Constantinople in 1452 froa th« Cysantine tapira, the Greeks 
and forks have had aildly oscillating bat Bore consistently 
poor relations with aaoh other. Theirs is a historic 
aniaosity that developed with the Greek Wars of 
Independence, the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the Greek 
Turkish Ware of 1919 to 1923. As of late, however, the 
oonfliots are siaply a result of oonstant reainders of 
historic wounds whioh, with the strong national pride of 
eaoh country, are very effective in recreating and 
reaffiraing the antique hostilities. Cyprus is the only 
ourrent wound whioh still festers, unoeasingly preventing 
the two countries froa forgetting the past, dealing with the 
probleas of the present, and working towards peace for the 
future. This, therefore, characterizes Cyprus as a 
significant and oertainly noteworthy oase to study. 
Furthermore, the idea of trying to force two historical 
eneaies together, especially on such a saall island is an 
enoraous challenge. The failure of this ohsllenge results 
in the continuing battles between the Greeks and Turks; if, 
however, this challenge could soaehow be conquered, and the 
two ooaaunities oould live together in pesos, the 
ranifieations would be huge. Cyprus oould ohange its 
ourrent status as the “Cyprus Question," to the Cyprus 
Example of two historic eneaies, ones pursuing autually
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exolusive goals, now working and living together as a 
unitary, paaceful, and productive republic.
By looking at a nap, one can see that Cyprus lies 
at the crossroads of three continents: Europe, Asim, and
Africa. More specifically, Cyprus is forty niles south of 
Turkey, sixty ailes west of Lebanon, two hundred forty niles 
north of Egypt, and five hundred niles east of Greece 
(Salih, 1978, p. 3). Cyprus is geographically in a hot spot 
and has been of interest to every ruler who has had it as 
part of its enpire— fron the Acheans in 2700 B.C., to the 
British until 1960. Even today, Cyprus as an independent 
republic has been used and abused because of its 
geopolitical inportance. The numerous and diverse 
doninanoes over Cyprus have each had their share of 
controlling the island's fate which has helped lead it to 
its present day condition.
In this thesis, an attenpt will be nade to show 
how the island, once fairly united, developed into a divided 
republic as a result of interooanunal and international 
tensions. It will not be the ain of this paper to place 
blaae or to turn the crisis into a aonooausal catastrophe.
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Instead, the goal of the paper is to exaaine the hiatorioal 
international influences on Cyprus in order to understand 
how the current division has occurred as a result and a 
culmination of all of these historical influences. It is 
only through this retrospective view of the formation of 
Cyprus as it is today that it is possible to traoe what 
factors played a role in the current division.
The historical international influences of the 
lust three empires— namely the Venetian, the Ottoman and the 
British— will be looked at as contributors, though at times 
involuntarily, to the current political and geographical 
division in Cyprus. Next, the Cyprus as an independent 
republic will be looked at, paying speoial attention to the 
Constitution which only served to institutionalize the 
already formed differences. Finally, because of their 
particularly strong impact on Cyprus, the historical 
influences of Greece and Turkey will be looked at separately 
and in more detail.
The Venetians
Cyprus' known history dates back to the Neolithic 
Age, or 5800 B.C. (Cypriot Student Organization, 1968, p.
3). Since this time, Cyprus has been ruled by the 
Phoenicians, Egyptians, Lusignans, Venetians, Ottomans, and 
finally the British before gaining their independence in 
1960 (Kennedy, 1975, p. 9). It is beginning from the time 
of the Venetians, however, that a historical survey will aid 
in the understanding of the present day conflict.
The Venetians were first attracted to Cyprus 
because of the value of the island as a trading center in 
the Levant and as an ideal location to base the Venetian 
fleets (Newman, 1953, p. 159). They came to Cyprus as 
merchants but soon became hopeful of dominating the island 
politically. In 1489, they did just that; they took control 
of the island from Queen Catherine Cornaro of the Lusignans 
and ruled for the following eighty two years (Spyridakis, 
1964, p. 41). During these years, the economy of Cyprus was 
ignored because the Venetians spent their time and money in 
building stronger fortifications in the major cities of 
Nicosia and Famagusta against a possible Turkish invasion;
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with the invention of gunpowder in the fourteenth century, 
the already existing Lu sign an fortresses were usele~=> 
aga inst the new artillery. In addition, the trade route to 
India via the Cape of Good Hope was discovered late in the 
sixteenth century which also lowered their prosperity and 
maritime trade (Salih, 1978, p. 4). Aside from the economic 
deterioration, several sources also describe the island as 
having had deteriorated culturally during the Venetian 
period. This cultural degeneration was attributed to the 
military and oppressive rule of the Venetians which 
restricted the personal liberties of the citizens and put 
the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus under the bondage of the 
Latin Church (Salih, 1978, p.4), (Spyridakis, 1984, p. 43). 
An observer on Cyprus in 15G8 described the Cypriots as 
slaves of the Venetian, being obliged to pay *he state a 
third of all of their earnings and to work for the state two 
days a week. The Cypriots were described as, “so flayed and 
pillaged that they hardly have wherewithal to keep soul and 
body together" (Lekas, 1955, p. 8). As a result of this 
oppressive rule as well as the natural disasters that Cyprus 
experienced: locusts, inundations, Turkish pirates, and
earthquakes, the population dropped from nearly half a 
million to about three hundred thousand (Lekas, 1955, p. 8).
It is helpful to recognise the oppressive and hard
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tines that the cyPriots experienced under the Venetians in
order to appreciate the inpact of the structural and 
cultural changes of the island under the Ottonan Turks.
1?
It was under the Sultan Selim II that the Ottoman 
Turks conquered Cyprus in 1571. The conquest was a result 
of the Ottoman Turks’ annoyance at the Venetian harassment 
of Turkish ships as well as for letting Maltese corsairs, 
who had raided and molested Muslim ships, into the 
Mediterranean. The conquest was also a result of the desire 
to gain territory in the Levant and to insure a supply of 
Cypriot wine (Salih, 1978, p. 4).
The four hundred year domination of the Ottoman 
Turks brought many demographic and structural changes to the 
island whioh set the stage for the present day conflict on 
Cyprus.
The most essential ohange whioh resulted from the 
Ottoman rule was demographic. Despite the many rulers which 
dominated over Cyprus in the past, the population managed to 
keep its Greek character which came with the Achaens in 2700 
B.C.. They had a "Greek personality;" they spoke Greek, 
followed the Greek Orthodox religion, and shared many of the 
same traditions with the Greeks (Coufoudakis, 1976, p. 9). 
During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, however, many
The Ottoman Turks
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Turkish speaking Muslima immigrated to Cyprus. Along with 
this large influx, came a new religion--Sunni Muslims of the 
Hanafi sect; a new language--Turkish; and a new ethnicity 
(Salih, 1978, p. 4). Moreover, Cyprus was no longer part of 
the wealthy and powerful Europe, as it had been in the past. 
It was now an "obscure" part of an empire more associated 
with the Middle Eastern traditions. These religious, 
linguistic, and ethnic differences may not have been 
themselves a cause for the division of 1974 but may, 
instead, have been factors which reinforced the communal 
tensions and the eventual division once it did occur.
The other changes on Cyprus during the Ottoman 
rule were more structural than cultural, although they did 
eventually have a cultural impact. First, they abolished 
the feudal system of serfdom which permitted the former 
serfs to become landowners.
Second, they administered the island by what they 
called the millet system which allowed each religious and 
ethnic group to have its own distinctiveness (Joseph, 1985, 
p. 27). This meant that the rayahs--all non-Muslim 
inhabitants of the Turkish Empire--were allowed to practice 
their religion after paying a fee (Mewman, 1953, p. 191).
The religious leaders were given a certain amount of 
political authority tc lead their community under the
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command of the Turkish supremacy. In Cyprus, this meant 
that the archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church mas given 
recognition as both the political and religious leader of 
the Greek Cypriot community for the first time in three 
hundred years (Joseph, 1985, p. 27).
It is because of the importance of the Church, 
whioh soon came to be the “champion of the Greek Cypriot 
cause,” that the millet system was so effective in allowing 
the Greeks to have their distinctiveness (Salih, 1978, p.5). 
The Orthodox Church was the center of all social, cultural, 
political, and intellectual life (Joseph, 1985, p. 27). In 
addition, the school systems, which are one of the 
fundamental institutions for political socialisation, were 
controlled by the Church. This meant that the antagonistic 
feelings which soon grew between the Greeks and the Turks 
would be taught in the Cypriot schools. The teaohers were 
Orthodox priests for the Greeks and Moslem priests for the 
Turks, which also set the stage for separatism since both of 
these religions play a big part in creating nationalistic 
feelings about the religion and state. This divisive 
educational system helped to create and perpetuate ethnic 
distinctiveness by transferring conflicting ethnic values 
from generation to generation (Joseph, 1985, p. 28). It is 
through the millet system, therefore, that the Greek
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Orthodox Church was allowed to exist and become a huge 
influence in creating Greek nationalism.
The religious freedom and the abolition of the 
feudal system are what made the Greek Cypriots initially 
welcome and accept their new leaders and neighbors. They 
worked together as ship owners and sailors, and as 
harvesters and merchants (Averoff-Tossizza, 1966, p . 42). 
Furthermore, the Cypriots felt that after the oppressive 
Venetian rule accompanied by all of the natural disasters, 
any change of power could only be a change for the good 
(Lekas, 1955, p. 8). Soon, however, problems began to 
arise. The very structural change which had brought an easy 
change of power over Cyprus, was the same change that 
started to cause strife between the two communities. The 
Muslims began to resent the strong authority that the Greek 
bishops were getting; Cyprus was the only province of the 
Ottoman Empire where the bishops were recognised as the 
actual rulers of the people, Orthodox and Muslim alike. In 
1765, after twenty five years of uncontested rule by the 
bishops, the Muslim Turks began to feel that their positions 
as conquerors was being reversed (Newman, 1953, p. 188).
The Turks demonstrated with riots and revolts and in 1804 
they managed to rise against the archbishop of the capitol 
Nicosia and make themselves rulers.
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Another factor which began to cause communal 
conflict related to the Ottoman Empire were the Greek Wars 
of Independence of 1821 and the resulting Greek state. Some 
sources say that the Greek Cypriots did not involve 
themselves in the wars until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 
and the Greek Turkish war of 1919-1923 (Joseph, 1985, p.28). 
Other sources boast of the courageous involvement of 
hundreds of Cypriots at the start of war in 1821 (Lekas, 
1954, p. 10). In any case, the most of the land that the 
Greek were fighting for independence from was under Ottoman 
rule. Turks accused the Cypriots of being in treasonable 
correspondence with the Greeks at the onset. Turkish 
suspicions resulted in violent public executions of bishops 
and archbishops which were followed by a general massacre of 
Christians on the island (Newman, 1953, p. 189). The Turks 
engaged in ‘confiscation of property, persecution of the 
population, and plundering during a six month reign of 
terror*' which obviously resulted in blatant communal 
conflict (Lekas, 1954, p. 10).
Another result of the Greek Wars for Independence 
which affected communal relations was the development of 
Greek nationalism among the Greek Cypriots. For the first 
two and a half centuries of Ottoman rule in Cyprus, prior to 
the Greek War of Independence, communal relations were
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determined by class, the family, the village, and religion 
and not by nationalism (Coufoudakis, 1976, p. 31)
Although the Cypriots had ethnic ties with the Greeks, it 
was not until the Greek War of Independence in 1821 that the 
Cypriot Greeks began to feel a national identification with 
Greece (Coufoudakis, 1976, p. 31). This growing tie had 
many ramifications in the Greek-Turkish Cypriot relations. 
For example, with the official recognition of the state of 
Greece in the Treaty of London in 1832, many Orthodox 
Cypriots wanted to rid themselves of the lowly position of 
rayah and, feeling ethnically related to the Greeks, went to 
the mainland to obtain Greek citizenship. These Cypriots 
could then return to the island having the status of a 
European, making them exempt from the heavy tributes the 
Turks had placed on the Orthodox Greeks. This process was 
used so much that Cyprus was soon described as a Greek 
colony (Newman, 1953, p. 190). This of course brought down 
many restrictions from the Turks on the Greek Cypriots 
hopeful of rising out of their low status.
Therefore, while the Greeks fought to rid 
themselves of the Ottoman rule, the Greek Cypriots fought to 
join themselves as part of the Greek rule. These breaking 
and forming of ties were what slowly formed both the 
division between the two communities of Cyprus and the
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consolidation between the Greeks and the Greek community on 
Cyprus.
It was during the time of the Ottoman Empire, 
therefore, that the seeds for conflict were planted. The 
demographic change brought about by the immigration of the 
Ottoman Turks to Cyprus did not in itself cause problems for 
the already existing Greek Cypriot community. It was only 
with certain structural changes that the differences among 
the two communities were enhanced which, in turn, began to 
cause communal tensions. The millet system, in particular, 
was a strong factor in dividing the two communities by 
allowing for so much independence of the Greek Orthodox 
Church and the rise of the rule of bishops which only caused 
resentment among the Ottomans living on the island. The 
Greek Cypriots already had grievances about the “rotten 
misrule of the Turks," (Lekas, 1955, p . 9) so when the 
communal tensions began, they only grieved more. Their 
unhappiness with the ruling empire as well as their growing 
awareness of their Greekness made it easy for them to feel 
ties with the mainland, especially at a time when the Greeks 
were so successful in shaking off the Turkish yoke that they 
too longed to be liberated from.
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issianBecause of the increasing threat 
expansioninn into Turkey, however, the Otter rulers were 
soon forced to put these communal tensions ie
background. At the Convention of 1878, L aconsfield,
the British Prime Minister, signed a treaty that allied 
Turkey and Great Britain against possible Russian invasion 
of the Turkish territories in Asia (Newman, 1 9 5 3, p. 198). 
Also, at this convention, under various agreements, many of 
which provided for fair treatment of the Orthodox 
population, Cyprus was ceded to Great Britain.
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The British
The change in donination from the Ottoman Turks to 
the British was, as with former dominations of the island, 
a result of the changes in sea-poser in the Bastern 
Mediterranean. England's particular interest in Cyprus was 
due to the island's location in relation to ♦ -.a Sues Canal 
where England along with France had, in 1875, purchased 
shares making them financially responsible (Newman, 1953, 
p. 200). The British occupation of Cyprus was different 
from the former occupations in that the interest in the 
island was both temporary and for purely strategic reasons. 
There was no interest in gaining revenue from the island; in 
fact, the surplus profits were paid annually to the Turkish 
sultan, as aooorded at the Convention of 1878. Thus, when 
England took military control in Bgypt and the Suez Canal 
oould be defended without the use of Cyprus as a base, the 
island became signifioantly less important to England. In 
1914, however, when Turkey went to war with England, the 
terms of the Convention oame to an end, Cyprus was annexed 
by Great Britain and, in 1925, the island beoame an official 
Crown Colony (Newman, 1953, p. 209).
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The guiding policy that the British used in their 
multiethnic and multireligious colonies urns that of divide 
and rule. With this policy they formalized ethnic 
divisions, and encouraged communal politicization 
(Coufoudakis, 1976, p. 34). In this manner, they prevented 
their colonies from becoming unified which also kept them 
wsak--thus insuring the British authority and dominance. 
Harsh oriticisms have been placed against this policy, 
especially as it was used in the case of Cyprus. Some 
sources go as far as blaming the division on Cyprus today 
entirely on the divide and rule policy of the British during 
their colonial reign while other sources say that the 
colonial policy of divide and rule maintained and 
reinforced, rather than caused, the ethnic, administrative, 
and political separation inherited from the Ottoman period 
(Stavrou, 1988, p. 10), (Joseph, 1985, p. 29). Neither of 
these views express the situation wholly or fairly, however. 
Although it is true that the divide and rule policy did 
contribute greatly to the divisions on Cyprus, it is also 
true that the otherwise more liberal English administration 
was forced to become more rigid by implementing a divide and 
rule poliov in reaction to the Greek Cypriot movement of 
enosis, or union with Greece.
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The enosis movement cane at tine when the British 
were engaged in a frantic reassessment of their position in 
the post World War II political international arena. They 
were guided by fear of losing yet another colony from their 
quickly diminishing empire. This same fear caused the 
British to react strongly by not only enforcing a strong 
divide and rule policy but one that was biased towards the 
less threatening Turkish minority. The Empire justified its 
strong and exaggerated reaction by the legal violation of 
the enosists. Since the Greek Cypriots were in fact trying 
to replace the existing English government with a Greek one, 
the British reaction to stop it, or to keep the existing 
order, was legitimate. It would not be entirely correct to 
call the British policy of divide and rule solely the cause 
nor the maintainor of division but a policy which was 
intensified in reaction to the pre-existing antagonistic 
national loyalties.
The British Empire, therefore, will be looked at 
as a contributor to the division in Cyprus as a result of 
its divide and rule policy. This policy and its effect on 
the division will be looked at further as a severe reaction 
to the enosis movement which changed the character of the 
policy to be actively biased towards Turkey and to be more 
rigid in general.
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2 .
The Divide and Rule Polioy Before the Enosis Hoveaent
The British policy of divide and rule was used 
before the large outbreak of the enosi? movement. The 
policy attributed to the division on the island in various 
ways and as such can be identified as one of the causes.
The results on the conaunal tensions from the pre-enosis 
stage divide and rule policies were like the effects of the 
aillet system under the Ottoaan Empire; they were indirect. 
Unlike the effects of the millet systea, however, the 
effects of the British policy of divide and rule were aore 
intentional.
The divide and rule policy manifested itself in 
various foras. The aost fundamental of these was through 
the Legislative Council. The Council consisted of members 
elected through proportional representation as well as 
appointed officials by the British Governor. This Counoil 
became the tool with which the two communities could aore 
easily be polarised (Coufoudakis, 1976, p. 34).
The Greek majority was neutralised through the 
intentional coalition of the British appointed members with 
the Turkish ainority. This caused the Greek Cypriots to 
feel that, though they were the aajority, they did not. have 
majority rights. As a result, they beoame frustrated and
began to resent the Turkish minority (Averoff-Tossizza.
1983, p. 132).
Another method of divide and rule enployed by the 
British was through the school systems. They expanded the 
already segregated school systems, keeping then divided 
rather than combining them to form unity, or Cypriotism. As 
mentioned earlier, these schools promoted nationalism to the 
"mother countries." The Greek Cypriots especially became 
very nationalistic through these segregated school systems 
because their personnel, instructional materials, textbooks, 
and teaching programs came directly from Greece. Soon, 
there was no difference between the teachings in Greece or 
Turkey than in Cyprus. The school systems, therefore, were 
very successful in instilling nationalistic feelings in the 
young. Furthermore, the school emphasized "religion, 
national heritage, ethnic consciousness, and the history of 
Greek-Turkish rivalry, suspicion, mistrust, and animosity," 
which taught love for the mother country and hatred among 
the bi-national neighbors on the island (Joseph, 1985, p. 
28).
The British Empire also deliberately allowed the 
free use of symbols of Greece and Turkey on Cyprus 
(Coufoudakis, 1978, p. 34). This meant that the Cypriots 
celebrated opposing holidays, such as the Oreek Independence
Day on March 25 which, for the Turkish Cypriots narks the 
beginning of the decline of the Ottoaan Empire. In 
addition, the Greek Turkish Cypriots fought as volunteers on 
opposite sides during the 1912-1913 Balkan wars, World 
War I, and the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1923 (Joseph,
1985, p. 28). With these kind of formal attachment to eneny 
countries, any hope having a working government with 
peaoeful and rational negotiations would be extremely 
difficult; and, to have any hope of a unified Cyprus would 
be next to impossible. Although the British did not fora 
these opposing loyalties, by letting such strong 
nationalisms to occur, England was sure of having a weak, 
bickering Cyprus--and certainly a disunited one, as she 
wanted.
This national segregation on Cyprus was 
intensified by this "deliberate colonial policy" which, 
aooording to Van Couloudakis, Professor at Indiana 
University:
...exaoerbated existing linguistic, religious, 
cultural, and ethnic differences; destroyed, by its 
vertical separation of the two eoaaunities, the 
horizontal bonds that had developed across these two 
coamunities; created national elites in each of the 
eoaaunities, whose task becaae the promotion and 
protection of their respective national interests; gave 
rise to separate political allegiances to the people of 
the two Cypriot ooaaunities; and, gave rise to the 
deatnds by both groups to control the various aspects 
of their respeotive oonnunity's fate, and their claias 
to separate political autonomy (Coufoudakis, 1978, p. 
34).
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By indirectly causing divisions and enhancing
previously existing divisions, the British Empire was able 
to keep the island of Cyprus full of conflict, 
immobilization, and disunity.
The Divide and Rule Policy and the Enosis Movement
It was easy for the British to implement their 
policy of divide and rule on Cyprus since the divisions were 
so clearly there; the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriot Greeks and 
Turks were all doing their part to divide the island. The 
enosis movement, in particular, divided the Cypriots and 
challenged the authority of the British, mak t their 
offensive policy of divide and rule both more neeeegfry end 
easier to be carried out. Thus, the Greek Cypriot sovgjftgfit 
catalyzed the growth of a more outright and severe divide 
and rule policy.
The period before the enosis movement, 1878 to 
1831, is described as the ”liberal phase" of the British 
administration (Polyviou, 1875, p. 2>. During this tie#, as 
noted above, the policies of Britain were subtle in their 
effort to keep the island divided. It was with the 
of enosis, which case to a head in 1831* that tha ruling
administration became more blatant and active in their 
efforts to keep the population separated and antagonistic so 
as to ensure Britain's position as the dominant power- In
order to understand Britain's reaction to the enosis 
movement, it will be helpful first to briefly review the 
ideas, movements, and counter-movement : involved with 
enosis,
Many sources equate and attribute the Greek 
Cypriot movement of enosis on Cyprus with a larger Gr ok 
movement, called the Hegali Idea which was the hope to 
reconstruct the Byzantine Empire under the Greeks. The 
Hegali Idea was originated at the time of the unexpected and 
numerous victories of Greece over the Ottoman Empire, which 
gave them the confidence to continue their revolts on a 
larger scale. In fact, when Great Britain occupied Cyprus 
in 1878, the bishop of Citiun told the first British high 
commissioner, Sir Garnet Wolseley, "He accept the change of 
Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help 
Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Inlands, to be united with 
Mother Greece, by which it is naturally connected" (Salih, 
1978, p. 5).
Because of this enosis movement, the future tf 
Cyprus as a Crown Colony seemed unoeritifi. The Britiih 
administration even found it necessary to announce several
tines that Cyprus would remain part of the British Empire; 
the enosists rightfully interpreted the need to make suoh 
statements as a sign of insecurity of the Empire which 
encouraged them to strive for their goals with more energy 
ar.d optimism for success. Riots developed throughout the 
island; by 1931 the Government House was burned• and 
finally troops were brought in from Egypt to bring peace.
At one point just before World Wtr II, England did offer 
Cyprus to Greece upon the agreement that she would 
immediately join the war on the side of Great Britain and 
the allies but the offer was refused by the Greek government 
who wished to stay neutral (Spyridikis, 1984, p. 44).
Meanwhile, although Turkey had formally lost 
Cyprus by joining the war on the side of the Germans, the 
Turks and Cypriot Turks felt that if the English did have 
any intentions ?f leaving the island, it should be given 
beak to Turkey and not joined to Greece as the eneaiats 
wished (Irtekun, 1961, p. 5). This is ironic, however, 
because until the 1840's and i960'a, Turkey did not show any 
interest in Cyprus. In 1919, for example, Kama! Ataturk, 
leader of the Turkish national movement, did not include 
Gyprua among the territories whioh he elaimed for Turkey in 
the 1819 national Net; and, in 1914 ha acknowledged the 
annexation of Cyprus to Greet Britain and gave up ell
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Turkish rights on Cyprus (Polyviou, 1975, p. 3). Finally, 
in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey signed in agreement 
that it had no rights or claims to Cyprus (Polyviou, 1975, 
p.  1). Despite this, the Turkish Cypriots developed the 
counterforce policy goals of taksim, or the partition of 
Cyprus into separate Greek and Turkish sections (Joseph, 
1985, p. 29). What, therefore, incited the Turkish people 
to rise up against these enosist movements? It can be 
clearly understood why the Turkish minority would object to 
being part of the hated Greek nation; this, however, is only 
a fragmented and misleading explanation of why and how the 
Turkish Cypriots got involved. It seems that with the 
understandable fear of the enosis movement, the British 
began to form a coalition with the Turks as a counter weight 
to the Greek demands. C.M. Woodhouse, the British liaison 
officer for the Greek resistance force during World War II, 
confirms this in his memoirs, Something Ventured, where he 
talks about the political situation »n Cyprus in 1954:
"Harold Macmillan, the Foreign Secretary, was 
urging us to stir up the Turks in order to 
neutralize the Greek agitation. I wrote a minute 
in opposition to this ta tic. I also asked the 
Prime Minister's private secretary if I could see 
Churchill on the subject, but he absolutely 
refused even to pass on the suggestion, which he 
clearly regarded as impertinent...(Hitchens,
1984, p. 43).
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It is difficult, of course, to say whether it was 
Britain who aroused the Turks, or if they would have 
mobilized anyway, given the animosity that had been growing 
between the two communities. In any case, it can be shown 
that Great Britain, as in Palestine and India used 
intercommuna1 differences to her advantage in order to gain 
and keep control. Furthermore, as in the case of the Suez 
invasion, Britain was acting as the arbitrator between two 
parties at war, in order to join and accelerate the cause of 
one of them (Hitchens, 1984, p . 45),
Through all of this, the desire for enosis was 
growing and by 1950, 96% ot the Greek Cypriots were in favor 
of uniting with Greece (Spyridikis, 1964, p. 45). This was 
the clear majority of the island since the Greek Cypriots 
made up 00% of the total population of 570,000 while the 
Turks only made up 18% (Polyviou, 1975, p. 1). By 1954, 
the Colonial Government was so concerned about the 
seriousness of the situation that they announced the "Anti- 
Sedition” law which called for severe punishment of anyone 
who advocated a change in regime, namely the enosists. This 
only made the enosists more adamant to reach their goal, and 
to stop nothing short of union with Greece (Coufoudakis, 
1976, p. 34). To counter this, a secretly formed group led 
by General George Grivas, EOKA (National Organization of
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Cypriot Fighters), began to resist the British constraints 
militarily (Spyridikis, lq64, p. 47). At first, it was 
aimed solely at the British but when, in the 1940's and 
1950's, the Turkish forces joined in against the Greeks, 
they too became targets.
Soon the Turks formed their own underground 
movement called Volkan (volcano) which later became known as 
the Turkish Resistance Organization, or TMT (Salih, 1978, p. 
9).
It is natural to have these Turkish counter-er >sis 
groups but it is when the British became actively supportive 
of these anti-Greek Cypriot organizations that an 
unnaturally large amount of antagonism and fighting between 
the communities resulted. It was in 1958, for example, that 
the first serious fighting between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots took place. It happened when a bomb exploded 
outside the Turkish consulate in Nicosia which, in turn, 
prompted the Turkish population to riot against a nearby 
Greek village. The bomb was obviously blamed on the Greeks 
who then suffered mass bloodshed and eviction from their 
homes. In 1985, however, Mr. Rauf Denktash, the Turkish 
Cypriot leader, admitted in a televised interview that it 
?as his own party that had placed the bomb. This is highly 
significant because at the time of the bomb, Denktash was an
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appointed British official. Furthermore, the party which 
was responsible for the bombing, called “Cyprus is Turkish,0 
was the only party legally permitted to exist on the island. 
At that time, all of the Greek parties were banned. In 
fact, the Greek flag had been banned, and all Greek 
newspapers were censured (Hitchens, 1985, p. 27). This 
incident clearly shows how the Greek movement of enosis 
brought about severe interventions by the British who then 
successfully instigated the first incident of fighting on 
the island.
This political polarization put strong divisions 
between the two communities, making negotiations or any sort 
of Cypriot nationalism obsolete. The British 
administration, outdoing themselves with their active 
surport of the Turkish minority and keeping in line with 
their divide and rule policy of governing, were able to 
arouse the Turks into action, to start confrontations 
between the two communities, and, in the end, look on while 
the killing and fighting ascended to an eventual invasion.
Despite all of the criticisms on the harshness of 
the British rule, it is true that with the British, the 
Cypriots were opened up to the European civilization which 
had developed and prospered in the past three hundred years 
of Ottoman rule (Newnan, 1953. p. 202). Under the British
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Empire, modern ideas and technology were introduced. Drains 
and roads were built and the general face of the island saw 
improvement (Vanezis, 1972, p. 45). The administration was 
fair and compromising until the revolts of enosis; why then 
did the revolts begin? Perhaps the dictum of Sir Henry 
Campbell Bannermann, "Good government is no substitute for 
self-government," answers this question (Lekas, 1955, p. 
39).
It was when the British refused to take seriously 
the Greek Cypriot's desire to be united with Greece that 
frustration and the feeling of oppression began to result 
The Greek Cypriots were a victim of the British-Turkish 
coalition but the Turkish Cypriots, too, were drawn in as 
victims of a deceivingly selfish British policy.
Finally, from 1955 to 1959, Greek Cypriots headed 
by EOKA and the Greek Orthodox Church engaged in a bloody 
anti colonial rebellion which was carried out in the name of 
enosis and was strongly supported by Greece. Once again 
both the Cypriot Turks and the mainland Turks reacted by 
demanding division. These expanding rivalries became 
burdensome to Britain. In addition, the internal conflict 
on Cyprus began to be of international concern, especially 
when both Greece and Turkey became actively involved in the 
crisis; the Turkish government began to supply military
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assistance to THT and the Greek government made enosis with 
Cyprus their official policy, Members of NATO began to be 
concerned about the possibility ji* a war between Greece and 
Turkey who were both members of the Organisation.
The Greek Cypriots were pleading to the United 
Nations for their right to self-determination while the 
Turks were unrelenting in their belief that if Cyprus m s  to 
be freed from the British it would automatically go back 
into Turkish hands. Finally, in 1958, after the fourth 
appeal to the United Nations, the General Assenbly 
recommended that a democratic solution to the problem be 
found. Thus began the Zurich-London Agreements which, on 
February 19, 1959, resulted in a constitution for Cyprus and 
the agreement that the island would become an independent 
state one year after the date of signing.
Cyprus as an Independent Republic
It is the way in which the constitution was formed 
and the general and specific ideas of the constitution which 
contributed greatly to the communal tensions and the 
eventual invasion of the island.
Before understanding why the constitution itself 
proved to be non-functional and detrimental to creating a 
unified Cyprus, it is necessary to understand that the 
conditions on the island, aside from the communal tensions, 
were not ready for an independent government. Once again, 
the British are blamed for not preparing Cyprus to be an 
independent state. Part of this stems from the fact that 
"one of the characteristic features of the British Colonial 
regime was that it never seriously envisaged its own ending"
(Po 1 yviou, 1975, p. 3). The same held true for Cyprus, even 
at a time when proposals for self-government were being 
presented to the administration; the British Government 
could not "contemplate a change of sovereignty in Cyprus"
(Polyviou, 1975, p. 3). There was no real attempt, 
therefore, to encourage the development of the political and 
social conditions which would be necessary for a self 
government. The resulting constitution and Republic was
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accurately called the 'bastard child of British Colonialism" 
by Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader (Stavrou, 1886, 
P. U).
The actual negotiations, or lack of, were also a 
contributing factor to the failure of the constitution. The 
agreement was made among representatives from Britain, 
Greece, and Turkey and was later signed by the 
representatives from the Greek and Cypriot communities, 
Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazil Kucuk (Salih, 1978, p.13). 
This, in itself, poses a problem. How could three countries 
with their own domestic incentives and motives be 
responsible for the construction of an entire state without 
even having representatives for the state there to approve 
or refute the clauses of the constitution. This was the 
second serious fault of the construction of the constitution 
and the Republic of Cyprus.
Finally, the actual clauses of the constitution, 
in an effort to keep the two communities from confrontation, 
actually invited separatism and even more conflict. Some of 
the key provisions of the Zurich-London Agreements, and the 
new constitution of Cyprus, were that the Republic of Cyprus 
would have a Greek Cypriot president, a Turkish Cypriot 
vice-president, each elected by their own communities, and 
each having the veto power over the House of Representatives
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decisions concerning foreign affairs* defense* and security; 
both the ideas of enosis and taksim would be Mforever 
prohibited"; and, the Cypriot civil service, security 
forces, and House of Representatives would be composed of 
seventy per cent Greek Cypriots and thirty per cent Turkish 
Cypriots, whereas the army would have a sixty to forty per 
cent ratio. In addition, in a effort to avoid confrontation 
and conflict, the new constitution aimed at keeping the two 
communities separate by such provisions as: having two 
separate communal chambers which would tax separately, and 
dividing the five largest towns into Greek and Turkish 
municipalities, each having its own council. Finally, the 
constitution incorporated two treaties: the Treaty of 
Guarantee which gave Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey the 
right to take action to maintain its independence and 
purposes of its constitution; and the Treaty of Alliance 
which allowed Greece to station nine hundred fifty men on 
Cyprus and Turkey to station six hundred fifty. The British 
also maintained two military bases (Salih, 1978, p. 14).
The Greek Cypriots were not satisfied with these provisions, 
feeling that all of their struggles for enosis had been 
futile. They also felt that with the disproportionate 
representation given to the Turkish minority, they could not 
be the ’masters of their own house” (Kennedy, 1974, p. 10).
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The Turks, too, were not wholly satisfied with the 
constitutional provisions, feeling that any sort of 
infringement on their constitutional right would leave them 
with no rights at all, but both the Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots felt that they had no alternative (Salih, 1978, p . 
14).
The "outsiders" thought that once Cyprus achieved
independence, its historical conflicts would cease (Salih,
1978, p. 5). This was not the case. The segregation
imposed by the new constitution only enhanced and
institutionalized the already growing divisions between the
two communities. The constitution was not functional; the
Turks were guided by fear of losing rights which prompted
them to veto all Greek proposals. An ineffective immobile 
governing body resulted which only helped to justify the
Greeks' desire for a unitary government--giving them the 
obvious advantage as the majority.
In sum, although enosis and taksim were ruled out. 
no alternative for a integrated Cyprus were given. The new 
Republic carried with it all of the conflicts, divisions, 
antagonisms, and mistakes of the past--only now they were 
institutionalized, giving each community a formal vehicle 
with which to promote the hostilities and conflicting 
interests.
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The Effects of Greece and Turkey on the Division
The effects that the various ruling empires have 
had on Cyprus have been examined thus far. More current and 
more far reaching, however, are the effects that Greece and 
Turkey have had on the crisis. The involvement of these two 
countries in the problems on Cyprus have caused the tensions 
to become even more intense. In addition, by intervening in 
the affairs of Cyprus both Turkey and Greece have put 
themselves at the b**ink of a war.
Greece and Turkey have had historical interest 
influence in Cyprus. For the Greeks, the interest has been 
purely ethnic. Cyprus, at five hundred miles from the Greek 
coastline, is too far to be of real military interest and 
has in the past been an economic burden on Greece, who has 
supplied military aid and personnel. For the Turks, Cyprus 
has been of ethnic importance hut has also been of strategic 
importance since it is only forty four miles off the Turkish 
coastline. These interests have been strong enough to 
guide both Greece and Turkey into hyper-ethnioism and strong 
nationalism; they are what guided the two countries into
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expanding the domestic problem on Cyprus into an enormously 
international one.
Although both Greece and Turkey had been actively 
involved in either supporting enosis or taksim from 1878 
throughout their duration, the turning point of involvement 
came when Greece appealed to the United Nations five 
consecutive times for the support of enosis. IiaxilfiY reacted 
by having massive anti-Greek demonstrations on Turkey; they 
attacked Greek schools, churches, shops, and houses, 
especially in Istanbul; they strongly enforced the movement 
of taksim; and, finally^ the demonstrations on the mainland 
culminated in the ousting of the Orthodox Patriarchate in
Istanbul (Joseph, 19885. p . 72).
In order to maintain and preserve these close 
cross boundary ties afte^ the independence of Cyprus, the 
following instruments were used: language, education, 
religion, culture, history, and military ties. 
Linguistically, Greece and Turkey identified with the 
respective Greek and Cypriot communities because of their 
common language of Greek and Turkish.
In the area of education, the mainland countries 
maintained ties by providing materials and teachers to the 
schools; since education was a major instrument of ethnic
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propaganda, they were successful in instilling the deep- 
rooted hatred between the two countries.
Religion also proved to be a strong contributor 
to maintaining the ethnic and cultural links between the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots and their 'motherlands.*’ Both 
religions, Greek Orthodox and Sunni Muslim taught that 
religion can not be divided or mixed--thus both enforcing 
the division on the island and the unity between the 
mainlands.
Culturally, the bonds between the two communities 
was strengthened by the celebration of common national 
holidays. Often times these holidays were mutually 
antagonistic against the other community. Greek 
Independence Day, for example, reminds the Turks of their 
loss of the Ottoman Empire while the Turks annually 
commemorated the victory of 1923 which expelled three 
million Greeks from Anatolia.
Unfortunately, the Greeks and Turks were also 
bonded closely to the Republic of Cyprus because of strong 
military ties. The treaty of guarantee which allowed nine 
hundred fifty Greek soldiers and six hundred fifty Turkish 
soldiers had active symbolic implications, kith the arrival 
of the Greek soldiers who hadn't been on Cyprus for seven 
hundred years and of the Turkish soldiers who hadn't been on
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Cyprus for nearly one hundred years, national sentiments, 
and loyalties were stirred up (Joseph, 1985, p. 83).
The effect of these bonds manifested themselves in 
Greek and Turkish military intervention in Cypriot affairs. 
The first such incident came with the 1983 crisis when the 
mainland Turks rejected the Cypriot President Hakarios' 
proposals for reform. Greece, resenting the intervention of 
Turkey, got involved too. These outside forces put 
additional tensions on the communities and fighting broke 
out. The Turkish Cypriots called out to Turkey for help 
from the numerically superior Greek Cypriots, while Greece 
threatened that any military action on the part of Turkey 
would result in the same from Greece. War was imminent but 
did not happen as a result of the pleading of the American 
President Johnson who was fearful of confrontation between 
two NATO allies.
Three months later, war was once again a threat 
when Greek Cypriots attacked the Turkish Cypriot enclave of 
Tylliria which was the only port to the Mediterranean and 
which was used by the Turks to smuggle in military aid and 
advisors. Once again, Cyprus was saved just in time by the 
force of the United Nations (Ertekun, 1984, p. 14).
These two incidents show the immense power of 
Greece and Turkey in being able to magnify the friction
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which was building in Cyprus. By intervening, the two 
countries escalated the disputes into what could have been a 
war.
In 1983, the Greeks terminated their efforts of 
enosis because it was politically disadvantageous; Greece 
could not gain international support with its desire for 
union at a time when decolonization was hailed as the 
necessity for freedom loving people. In addition, the 
growing communist community, AKEL (Progressive Party of the 
Working People) did not share the views of enosis. Since 
they were nearly thirty per cent of the population and 
strong supporters of Makarios, they had to be listened to. 
Finally, enosis had been prohibited by the constitution and 
the Greeks and Greek Cypriots did not want to violate it, 
giving the Turks all the more reason to oppose them (Joseph, 
1985, p. 93) .
Over ten years later, in 1974, mainland Greeks 
forcefully reversed this positive action of ending enosis. 
This was a result of a Greek coup d'etat of the existing 
dictator with an extreme right military junta. The 
catastrophe which was to follow in the months ahead began 
because of this junta and its support of enosis. The junta 
acted on Cyprus by forcing a coup on Hakarios and instilling 
a puppet government which supported enosis. As a response
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to what they interpreted as an effort to annex Cyprus to 
Greece, Turkey invaded thirty seven per cent of the island 
from the north. Both the United States and Great Britain 
had failing attempts to stop the invasion and to prevent 
another one. They tried to negotiate with the Greeks and 
Turks in Geneva but had no success. At the conferences in 
Geneva, the Greeks threatened a full scale attack on Turkey. 
The Turks, on the other hand, did not come to negotiate, 
only to accept the capitulation of the Greeks and, soon 
after the Geneva Talks, launched another huge attack on 
Cyprus. With this attack came a rearranging of the 
population. The Greeks in the north of Cyprus were forced 
to move to the south while the Turks were forced to do the 
opposite. As such, one third of the people on Cyprus became 
refugees on their own island. These invasions completed the 
long history of communal tensions between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. There was no longer any hope for 
negotiations or reversal of the enmity which was so deeply 
rooted into the Cypriot's psyche. Mine years of absolutely 
no communication was followed by the grand finale of the 
declaration of the Northern Republic of Cyprus by Turkey in 
1983. At first, the Greeks had as their policy to 
reverse this action which was condemned by the Security 
Council, the Council of Europe, the European Community, and
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the British Commonwealth summit conference but the invasion 
of 1974 made the Greeks realize that they no longer have the 
upper hand so they have agreed to negotiate on a the 
foundation of a bicommunal federal state (Joseph, 1985, p. 
103).
¥■'
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Conclusion
Solution for Today: Partition or Unity?
"'Is not almost everybody quite happy with the 
situation at the present time? Turkey has her 
troops there, Turkish Cypriots are safe. Greek 
Cypriots are prosperous; they have most of the 
island. It gives Greece something to complain 
about, which they like'” (Hitchens, 1987, p. 12).
On one hand, it seems that perhaps Cyprus has now 
finally reached its final, or at least temporary, solution 
with partition. In order to combine the two communities on 
the island, not only would the Turkish Cypriots have to 
break their strongly developed unity with the Turks, but the 
Greek Cypriots would have to indicate that they were ready 
to break ties with Greece as well. This would mean the 
complete abandonment of enosis. Although in 1963, the new 
democracy in Athens and President Hakarios indicated that 
they had abandoned the idea of enosis as a solution (Joseph, 
1985, p. 92), the Greeks and Greek Cypriots indicated 
otherwise. In January 27 1974, General George Grivas, the 
extremist advocate of enosis and leader of EOKA, died of a 
heart attack and was buried in Athens with the soil from the
®Ib
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Parthenon as he had requested. During his leadership, he 
had incited radical and excessive ideas; for example, he 
swore that no Turk would step foot on Cyprus as long as he 
was aiive--which he accomplished. That which is 
significant, however, is that the government in Athens and 
Nicosia had always regarded him as a radical who had begun 
to lose his support after 1 9 6 3 . When three hundred thousand 
activists showed up at his funeral, however, it became clear 
that his extremist stance was not as fanatic* or remote as 
previously thought. In other words, there was still a large 
following of enosis (Lechios, interview, December, 1988). 
This large support was demonstrated at a tine before there 
had been any Turkish invasions; since these supporters of 
enosis indicated an accord with Grivas' maxim that no Turk 
would step foot on Cypriot soil, it would seem apparent that 
after there were thirty thousand Turks occupying nearly 
forty per cent of the land, the activists would only be 
encouraged to advocate enosis even more. With this Greek 
support of enosis, and the Turkish action of taksim, neither 
the Greek side nor the Turkish side seem ready to support an 
independent Cypriot state.
More recent cases also demonstrate that perhaps 
Cyprus is indeed headed for a permanent division. In the 
past, the Turks on the island spoke Greek, now, of course,
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it is a rarity, it is only tha eldars who can still spsak 
Greek. With the organisation of THT, the young were 
inspired to keep their Turkishness and as a result did not 
speak Greek. Now, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf 
Denktash, does not even speak Greek (Lechios, interview, 
December, 1988). This change from the past demonstrates a 
solid confirmation of a lasting division. It would seem 
unfair to expect the Turkish Cypriots to take the action to 
assimilate and learn Greek since they should both work 
towards unity. It would seem, however, that only the older 
generations, who were closer to the time of the invasion 
would be too proud as invaders to assimilate to the culture 
of the conquered. It is these older people, however, who 
did assimilate to the majority, at least enough to be able 
to communicate with them. This was a positive action on the 
part of these older Turkish Cypriots towards good relations 
between the two communities on the island. Whether it was a 
unilateral effort towards good relations, or at least good 
communication, is now irrelevant; the current status which 
shows the young Turkisn Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriot 
leader not speaking Greek is simply another step toward 
disunity. Without a means to communicate, the Cypriots are 
nearly in a position to beg for outside parties to interfere 
as mediators, and translators. In order to have any sort of
independence, the Cypriots--whether it be in G f-ek, Turkish, 
or English-* need to communicate.
Finally, the Greek and Turk, :h Cypriots both 
indicate that they still hate each other--a fact whi^h does 
not give much reason to i emove the partition a! ' fhe United
Nations peace keeping forces which line th< b i r A
recent article in the New York Tim^s tells abo-.v sev.- teen 
year old Alexia Chronia, a Greek Cypriot living ir the 'it 
who went to visit her parents in a Greek Cypriot enclave in 
the Turkish occupied North. There, she met anft; r 
seventeen year old, Cengiz Coskun, a national srkish Musi 
(not Cypriot Turkish) with whom she fell in love and married 
in a coffee shop. No one recognized the marriage and when 
she returned to her city in the south, she was greeted as an 
outcast and was told to forget her marriage and have nothing
to do with Turks, When Cengiz was smuggled into the south,
he was promptly greeted by the U.N. troops and arrested and 
sent back to Turkey by Greek Cypriot police. He was charged 
with entering the island illegally as a settler from Turkey 
since he was part of the sixty thousand Anatolian settlers 
who came in 1974 (Cowell, April 7* 1989, p, 5). This one 
marriage is enough to show how both communities still feel 
about cne another after partition. With the division, the 
two sides have 'grown apart, looking in opposite directions,
and a generation is growing in enforced separateness. The 
distinctions of language, religion and identity seen to 
deepen" (Cowell, April 7, 1989, p, 5). Yet, inherent in 
this example which shows the two sides as bitter enemies, 
there is a spark of optimism; a young Turk and a young 
Greek Cypriot resisted their learned hatred for each other 
and fell in love.
Any change, any unification, of the island would 
not benefit the current generation since it would need to be 
done slowly and with many precautions. Many difficult times 
would have to be passed before the republic could benefit 
from the unity. It would be the younger generations that 
would profit and this example with Alexia Chronia shows that 
the hope for the younger generations is in the young 
themselves.
Indeed, the division on Cyprus has enhanced the 
differences making unity seem further and further away* 
There is hope, however, and not Just from the younger 
generation. First, it must be understood why separation is 
not an acceptable solution for sither side.
For the Greek Cypriots, the arguments against 
partition are more obvious. First, they are still hurting
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from the actual act of invasion and the resulting eviction 
from their homes. Following the invasion, five thousand 
Cypriots were killed and two hundred became refugees on 
their own land. Furthermore, the northern part of Cyprus, 
which was subsequently declared Turkish, incorporated the 
island's most economically developed land, which caused 
obvious resentment on the part of the Greek Cypriots. These 
bad feelings cannot be forgotten when there are still a few 
hundred Greek families who are living in the Northern part 
of Cyprus and who are forced to send their own children to 
the south where they can get a Greek education. These Greek 
enclaves will be the first to go without water during a 
drought and are denied any sort of Greekness (Cowell, April 
7, 1969, p. S). In addition, the Greeks are resentful of 
the fact the Turks came and sundered "three-quarters of a 
million people from architecture, wealth and culture that it 
took them nine unbroken millennia to create" (Hitchens,
1987, p. 12).
The Churches, of course, were seized also. At one 
Church in Lourouj ina, and perhaps at others, the cross at 
the top of the Church was destroyed and replaced by a 
Turkish flag (McCarthy, 1988, p. 4). For the Greeks, no 
bigger desecration is possible. On the cliff of the 
Fentadactylos range which overlooks the southern part of
'LL.
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Cyprus, a huge star and crescent, the symbols on the Turkish 
flag, along with a “taunting Turkish military slogan are 
blazoned on the hillside" (Hitchens, 1987, p. 12).
On the side of a Greek Cypriot road, a sign reads, 
"The invasion of 1974, never forget it" (McCarthy, 1988, p. 
4). With such reminders, especially on an island where 
"long memories are an industry," no one is even given a 
chance to forget it (McCarthy, 1988, p. 4).
For the Turkish Cypriots, the division is not an 
acceptable solution because they are living as a province of 
Turkey. They are under military rule and have the "Turkish 
ambassador" present at all the parliamentary meetings; for 
these reasons, large numbers still vote against the 
partition (Hitchens, 1987, p. 12). In addition, Turkish 
Cypriots who were previously living in the south, were 
forced to move to the north and, like the Greek Cypriots, 
are refugees on their own island. Also, while the Greek 
Cypriots have managed to recover some sort of economic 
development and modernization, the Turks in the north are 
still without modern conveniences and, of course, are 
without the luxuries such as "shops, night clubs, or hair 
dressers" (Cowell, April 7, 1989, p. 5).
For both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the 
situation is unacceptable. As has been shown in example
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after example the partition on the island has only enhanced 
the differences and made the two communities grow apart.
They are both in a humiliating position, like animals behind 
a cage, who cannot be trusted to be let out. They are 
physically blocked from crossing the border. Even if a 
tourist wanted to go from the Greek side to the Turkish 
side, he must first, go to Ankara to obtain a removable visa. 
He cannot return to the Greek side past six in the evening 
and is not allowed to bring packages back. Perhaps, it can 
be argued, such a partition is necessary given the 
passionate inability of either side to forget past 
grievances or to admit to wrongdoings. It seems, however, 
that such a partition benefits nobody on the island. It 
does not allow for any sort of mixing of the two communities 
to develop. Christopher Hitchens, long time correspondent 
on Cyprus, compares Cyprus to other nations:
"I have been to the Allenby bridge on the Jordan, 
and tc the Berlin Wall arid to Panmunjom in Korea.
I have been patted down by British soldiers on the 
country roads in Donegal which demarcate the Six 
Counties. But only the Koreans are separated like 
the Cypriots. Palestinians have later to supper 
with Jewish comrades. West Germans visit 
relatives or make day trips. Irishmen come and go 
as they please. For the Cypriots a form of 
apratheid has been contrived. It has been made 
physically impossible for a Greek and a Turk to 
share a drink together. In this humiliating 
position they are made co listen to lectures from 
visiting politicians who urge them to forget their
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differences and cease brooding upon the past” 
(Hitchens, 1987, p. 12).
Few people, and certainly fewer Cypriots, want 
partition. Internationally, as a solution to such problems, 
partition has shown to be a failure, or at least a cause of 
constant problems. The island cannot support two separate 
economies and, finally, division as it stands was prohibited 
by the Constitution and was supposed to be stopped by the 
Treaty of Guarantee. Who then, is the division for? Since 
no one recognizes it, why hasn't it been stopped?
According to Hitchens, the invasion "has little to 
do with minority rights. It has to do with wrenching the 
lives of the islanders apart in order to suit more cynical 
interests" (Hitchens, 1987, p. 13). He points out the 
convenience of the partition for British so they can be 
assured of a safe military base for future endeavors in the 
Middle East; in proving his point, he notes that there are 
plans for n giant airfield at Lefkoniko, for example.
Aside from all this, it is the Cypriots who are still being 
asked to change, to forget the past, to stop fighting, and 
to live together peacefully:
"The struggle for the Cypriot majority is not an 
easy one and it has by no means always been 
flawlessly led. But it can still be supported 
without any legal, historical, moral or political 
qualm. Can the same be said by those who, having
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found it too much trouble to rebuke the invader, 
have now turned to persuading the invaded?” 
(Hitchens, 1987, p.  13).
With all of these factors indicating that the 
partition does not suit the Cypriots, and with all of the 
factors which enhance the division, what is the chance for a 
solution that benefits the Cypriots themselves? The hope 
seems to lie in the leadership. Finally, after ten years of 
silence, under the new President of Cyprus, George 
Vassiliou, talks have begun to take place. His hope lies in 
both the fact that his entire policy will be focused on 
rectifying the Cyprus problem and that the world's conflicts 
were in the process of being resolved: Afghanistan, Angola 
and Kampuchea, and that it was now Cyprus' turn. More 
significantly for Cyprus, Vassiliou's hope lies in the fact 
that the two superpowers' relations have been warming and 
their goals in the Middle East have been mutual commitment 
to peace and security. With the military occupation in the 
north, however, the tensions are kept alive thus rejecting 
the goals of the superpowers (Tsomokos, 1988, pamphlet).
In talks in early September of 1989, both sides, 
Vassiliou and Rauf Denktas , representative of the Turkish 
region, have met together and have agreed that they need to 
create an atmosphere of mutual trust. A1 though the means to
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attain such easily stated objectives remain vague* there is 
great significance in the fact that .hey are even talking to 
one another and coming away from the meeting optimistic. As 
Vassiliou said after the talks, "The biggest achievement of 
the day is that we have the feeling we can talk to one 
another," (Lewis, 1988, p. All). Denktash also said that, 
"the chemistry was good," and Mr. Vassiliou is a "pleasant 
man to talk to" (Lewis, 1988, p. All).
With both sides talking, killings are rare and 
heated verbal arguments have cooled. It is Vassiliou s aim 
not only to negotiate but to dismantle the country's 
military, including the mandatory draft. He would like to 
see the money spent on weapons go toward economic 
development instead. This demilitarization includes, of 
course, the removal of the thirty thousand Turkish troops in 
the northern part of Cyprus. He has tried to show Denktash 
and his people that he has no intentions of Hell* nizing 
Cyprus and, furthermore, that in demilitarizing the island, 
he would, as the economically advantaged side, help the poor 
Cypriot Turks in the north (McCarthy, 1988, p. 4).
While political talks continue, progress is also 
being made in the business sector. It seems that with the 
character of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who each 
have "selective amnesia about its own past mistakes and
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violence” (McCarthy, 1988, p. 4) it is best to deal with the 
Cyprus problem apolitically. With article after article 
about the business ventures between Greeks and Turks and 
economic improvements on Cyprus, it seems that a solution 
which completely ignores the past and present and deals only 
with forming mutually rewarding businesses, there is a more 
realistic hope for a peaceful solution. In addition, with 
the unification of the European Community in 1992, Turkey is 
extremely anxious to gain economic benefits by being 
admitted into the EEC. Her wish is not being permitted as 
long as she has troops in another European country, Cyprus. 
With this stronghold over Turkey and the development of the 
successful businesses, a more feasible route to peace seems 
to have been paved.
For example, Cyprus had been involved in heavy 
development programs which form the basis of its economic 
growth and have encouraged creditors and bankers to come to 
Cyprus. The island, may, in fact, eventually be replacing 
Lebanon as the banking center of the Middle East both 
because of the many banks who are investing in Cyprus and 
because of the crises in Lebanon. Eight large banks have 
been granted licenses to operate on Cyprus and the 
government tw currently trying to attract big-name banks
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like Citibank and Banque National© de Paris so that aore 
branches will follow (Haney, 1984, p . 39).
Mainland Greece and Turkey are also, for the first 
tine in fifty years, engaging in cooperative business 
transactions. There is hope for big opportunities for both 
sides in trade expansion and joint ventures. The only 
obstacles are the Turkish troops in Cyprus and several 
nontariff barriers and buieauoratic delays. A recent 
meeting in Athens between leaders of the business 
connunities, however, resulted in about two fifty Billion 
dollars worth of deals (Heed, 1988, p. 51).
kith the economic interests of these businessmen 
which far outweigh their political interests, they were able 
to negotiate and make mutually benefiting deals. If this 
continues with success, relations between Greece and Turkey, 
between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, may improve and 
be naturally quite beneficial to Cyprus.
kith the additional pressure for Turkey to remove 
troops from Cyprus in order to become part of the BBC, it 
seems that soon some sort of solution must be found.
Moreover, another pressure whioh is making the two leaders 
negotiate more often is the June 1, 1989 deadline imposed by 
the United Nations for some sort of conclusion to the Cyprus 
problem. Even if it takes selfish motives like economic
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benefits or imposed deadlines to get the two countries 
motivated to hasten talks toward a solution, it is certainly 
well worth it for the peace of the Cypriots.
***
By looking at the international interferences in 
the history of Cyprus, it seems that both the Greek Cypriots 
and the Turkish Cypriots have been the victim of outside 
selfish domestic policies which have found it advantageous, 
for one reason or another, to keep Cyprus divided and in 
conflict. As former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson said, 
Cyprus is, “a collection of open barrels of powder and 
dynamite that everybody is throwing cigarettes inM (Stavrou, 
1908, p. 15).
Contrary to the Cypriot officials, who, in 1974, 
#aid, "our geogrirhio location will prove our salvation,” 
(Stavrou, 1900, p, 13) It seems that the geographic location 
of Cyprus has proved its damnation.
It would not be fair, of course, to ignore the 
passionate and fanatic ethnieism, on the pert of the 
Cypriots. If not the cause of division, these extreme loyal
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ties certainly made the job easier for the outsiders who 
found it politically advantageous to create conflict.
By understanding Cyprus* past, full of struggle 
and disappointments, and by understanding the complexity of 
ethnically guided politics, it is easier to realise both 
the limits and possibilities for finding an acceptable 
solution.
Ironically, in ancient mythology, Cyprus was the 
home of Aphrodite, the goddess of love. Hopefully, with 
the ne»’ leadership and interest in business advancements, a 
solution can be found, the ethnic pride can be reduced to 
normal levels, and Cyprus as the home of Aphrodite will no 
longer be an irony.
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